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ABSTRACT

This paper utilises a new critical juncture framework to help us determine whether changes to
Mexican macroeconomic policy in the early 1980s, and Brazilian macroeconomic policy at the
turn of the century, were clean breaks with the past, or continuations of previously established
policy pathways.

The framework consists of three elements, which must be identified in

sequence in order to declare, with some certainty, if an event was a critical juncture. These are
crisis, ideational change, and radical policy change.

Keywords: Mexico, Brazil, economic, critical, juncture.

Section 1: Introduction
Crises are often blamed for bringing about abrupt institutional/policy changes (Mahoney, 2000;
Pierson, 2000; Gorges, 2001). Crises are seen as providing political leaders with the opportunity
to implement new plans.

The result is a tendency to link economic crises with radical

institutional/policy changes. However, this fails to take account of, nor does it attempt to
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understand, those instances where an economic crisis, instead of being followed by radical policy
change, is followed by extant policy continuity. Blaming crises for radical policy change misses
subtleties at the heart of the process.
Despite the importance applied to critical junctures in our perception of change, our
understanding of the concept is limited due to the limited attention that has been paid to it
(Pierson, 2004). Critical junctures have been examined using unwieldy frameworks (Collier and
Collier, 1991; Mohoney, 2001), counterfactual analysis (Fearon, 1996), and case specific criteria
(Hogan, 2005; 2006). This has restricted our ability to identify and compare critical junctures,
and to differentiate them from other forms of change, such as incremental change, that over
decades might transform a policy or institution.
Just because a crisis comes before a radical policy change does not indicate a cause and
effect relationship, which scholars (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000;
Gorges, 2001) have sometimes assumed. The critical juncture framework developed by Hogan
and Doyle (2007; 2008) contends that such a linkage is an oversimplification, failing to take
account of the specific circumstances involved. It argues that an economic crisis is a necessary,
but insufficient, condition for radical economic policy change. According to the framework, a
critical juncture consists of crisis, ideational change, and radical policy change. The framework
rests upon the hypothesis that a crisis induced consolidation of a new idea – replacing an extant
idea – leads to significant policy change. Thus, the framework should be capable of explaining
why certain crises lead to critical junctures in policies, whereas others do not, as the
differentiating factor between them is ideational change. The framework contends that without
ideational change the level of policy change, in response to a crisis, can be of the first or second
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order, but not the third.1 Ideational change is the intermediating variable between crisis and
policy change.
Figure 1 Critical Juncture Approach

This framework has been used to examine change in macroeconomic policy in America, Britain,
Ireland, and Sweden. Here, the macroeconomic difficulties affecting Mexico at the start of the
1980s, and Brazil at the turn of the 21st century, are examined and compared using this
framework. Our objective is to discover if the economic difficulties affecting both countries
constituted crises, and, if so, did these lead to changes in the ideas underpinning their
macroeconomic policies, and the subsequent nature of Mexican and Brazilin macroeconomic
policies. Using Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework will provide an insight into the
mechanics of policy change, and the value of employing a critical junctures framework that
produces comparable results, even thought the cases selected for examination are separated
politically, geographically, and temporally. The framework’s applicability across countries, and
time, is of particular value, as it makes the concept of the critical juncture less nebulous and case
specific, thereby enhancing its significance to our understanding of policy change.

Was

macroeconomic policy in Mexico in the early 1980s, and in Brazil in the early 2000s, a
continuation of, or a break with, the past?

Section 2: The Characteristics and Uses of the Critical Junctures Approach
Critical junctures are seen as branching points that set processes change in motion. The literature
sees critical junctures resulting in the adoption of an institutional arrangement from among
1

Borrows from Hall’s (1993) concept of first, second and third order change.
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alternatives (Mahoney, 2000: 512).

Thereafter, the pathway established funnels units in a

particular direction (Mahoney, 2003: 53).
For some, a critical juncture constitutes a brief period in which one direction or another is
taken, while for others, it is an extended period of reorientation (Mahoney, 2001). The concept
has been employed in comparative politics. Collier and Collier (1991) used a critical juncture
framework in their analyses of labour movements in Latin America. Mahoney (2001) employed
a similar framework examining the liberalisation of Central America. For Collier and Collier
(1991) and Mahoney (2001) critical junctures took decades to occur. Hogan (2005; 2006)
questioned whether these periods were instances of incremental change, labeled by Streeck and
Thelen (2005) periods of conversion.
In relation to short term change, Garrett and Lange (1995: 628) showed that electoral
landslides created critical junctures by producing mandates for policy change. Casper and
Taylor (1996) employed the concept in analysing liberalisation of authoritarian regimes, while
Hogan’s (2005; 2006) remoulded the framework to examine change in trade union influence
over public policy. Karl (1997) employed the concept of critical junctures in analyzing how
“petro-states” became locked into problematic development pathways, while Gal and Bargal
(2002) used critical junctures to analyze occupational welfare in Israel. Flockhart (2005) used
critical junctures to explain the gap between Danish voters and their politician’s attitudes
towards the European Union (EU).
The literature is inconsistent in how it quantifies, and differentiates, critical juncutres
from other forms of change. However, the fact that Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework
is rigorous may resolve this. It should produce consistent findings, enabling us to determine
whether the changes to Mexican and Brazilian economic policy constituted critical junctures.
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Section 3: The Countries Selected for Examination
Through studying politics on a comparative basis we can discover trends, and achieve an
understanding of broader characteristics (Blondel, 1995: 3). The value of comparison is the
perspective it offers, and its goal of building a body of increasingly complete explanatory theory
(Mahler, 1995). Comparative historical analyses, concerning different time periods, is also
beneficial (Lieberman, 2001: 5). To provide different, but comparable cases, we draw our case
selections from two countries, separated by two decades.
Mexico in (1981-1983), and Brazil (1999-2003), are examined based upon the criteria of
“most similar” and “most different.” The selection requirements for “most similar” are that both
countries are Latin America states, in the time periods examined are democratic, and are
presidential federal republics. Both countries’ economies are amongst the world’s largest. In
terms of differences, Brazil was colonised by the Portuguese, while Mexico was colonised by the
Spanish, giving them different cultural heritages. Brazil is almost 5 times the size of Mexico,
has twice the population, but has a shorter history as a democracy. In the early 1980s Mexico
had import substitution policies (Panizza, 2005), while by the late 1990s Brazil was operating a
free market approach (Panizza, 2005). Their similarities will ensure ‘the contexts of analysis are
analytically equivalent, to a significant degree,’ while their differences will place the ‘parallel
processes of change in sharp relief’ (Collier, 1997: 4).

Section 4: Policy Change and Identification
Policy change must be seen in the context of societal and political change. Utilizing Hogan and
Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework, we examine macroeconomic policy change in discrete stages.
The first examines the economy to see if it was in crisis. A crisis implies prevailing policy
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cannot be sustained without deterioration (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995: 14).
economic crisis we develop observable implications.

To test for

The framework’s second stage tests for

ideational change. New ideas can change the policy environment (Pemberton, 2000: 790). But,
how ideas influence policy is something theorists have long grappled with (Taylor, 1993).
Where do ideas come from? How do they relate to failing policies? Why do ideas underlying a
failing policy sometimes change, resulting in policy change, whereas other times they remain
unaltered? To answer this, a second set of observables, based on Legro (2000), are set out. The
framework’s third stage tests for policy change. These observables are based upon Hall (1993),
tying together the concepts of policy change, societal learning, and the state.

Section 4:1 Testing for a Macroeconomic Crisis
Scholars regularly ‘agree that severe recessions make significant structural changes possible as
they render politics highly fluid’ (Garrett, 1993: 522). However, economic crises are rare,
rendering definition difficult (Yu et al., 2006: 439). How do we identify a crisis? For Stone
(1989: 299) a situation does not become a problem until it is controllable. But, it is controllable
it must be measurable, otherwise how would we know if we are controlling it? Thus, even
economic crises must be quantifiable.
Berg and Pattillo (1999) advocated examining individual variables when quantifying
currency crises. Pei and Adesnik (2000: 138-139) developed a range of criteria for identifying
macroeconomic crises: annual inflation greater than 15 percent, stagnant gross domestic product
(GDP), and historians and other analysts’ descriptions of deterioration in economic
circumstances. Frankel and Rose (1996: 351) define a “macroeconomic crisis” as a stagnant
economy, where investment is in decline, inflation, interest rates, and unemployment are above
15 percent, and actors perceive an economic crisis. For Solimano (2005: 76) a macro-economic
6

crisis can be identified through indicators and perceptions of growth, inflation, employment
creation, and poverty.
We seek to identify macro-economic crises through quantitative and qualitative
measures.

Defining anything as a crisis, including a macro-economic downturn, requires

subjective and objective deliberations (Pei and Adesnik, 2000: 139). Consequently, González
(2005: 93) suggests adopting a multifaceted approach. Agents must diagnose, and impose on
others, their notion of a crisis before collective action to resolve uncertainty can take meaningful
form (Blyth, 2002: 9).
We use a range of observable implications which seek to identify change in nominal
economic performance, as well as in perceptions of economic health (Hogan and Doyle, 2007;
2008).
O1. If GDP growth was stagnant/negative, the economy may have been in crisis.
O2. If debt as a percentage of GNI was above 100 percent, the economy may have been in
crisis.
O3. If inflation was above 15 percent (Pei and Adesnik, 2000), the economy may have been
in crisis.
O4. If the interest rate was above 15 percent, the economy may have been in crisis.
O5. If unemployment was above 15 percent, the economy may have been in crisis.
O6. If opinion polls find the public regard the economic in crisis, the economy may have been in
crisis.
O7. If the media regarded the economy in crisis, the economy may have been in crisis.
O8. If economic and political commentators regarded the economy in crisis, the economy may
have been in crisis.
O9. If the central bank regarded the economy in crisis, the economy may have been in crisis.
O10. If both domestic and international organisations monitoring economic performance
regarded the economy in crisis, then the economy may have been in crisis.
7

O11. If elected representatives regarded the economy in crisis, the economy may have been in
crisis.
O12. If government pronouncements on the economy were consistent with a crisis management
approach, the economy may have been in crisis.

The Mexican Economy in the Early 1980s
After 1945 Mexico sought growth through import substitution (Narula, 2002).

Industries

developed behind import quotas. This increased the country’s international trade, decreasing its
foreign dependence. The model succeeded as there was demand for Mexican raw materials.
However, it created a private sector dependent upon state protection (Hernandez, 2008)2.
President Echeverria’s (1970-1976) administration allowed fiscal and monetary discipline
collapse (Serra-Puche, 2008)3, marking the exhaustion of the policy of “stabilising development”
(Narula, 2002).

Rubio4 (2008) blames the failures of stabilising development on falling

agricultural exports, rapid population growth, and middle class disillusionment with its inability
to express itself in a one party (Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)) dominated culture.
However, once oil reserves were discovered by Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), the state oil
company, in the late 1970s (Calderón-Madrid, 1997), the hope was that oil revenue would
stabilise the economy.

However, this only circumvented the dangers of immediate crisis,

without resolving the economy’s structural problems (Nelson, 1990: 95). This was evidence of
the temporary solutions often sought by Mexico’s political elite (Tournaud, 2008).5

2

Luis Miguel Beristain Hernandez, PhD in Administrative Sciences. Business and Politics professor, Director of
Professional Development, Enterprise Development and Social Development at ITESM (Interviewed July 2008).
3
Jaime Serra Puche, PhD in Economics. Mexican Politician. Secretary of Commerce and Industry in 1988;
Treasury Secretary in 1994; and Mexico’s representative in NAFTA negotiations in early 1990s. (Interviewed June
2008).
4
Luis Rubio, PhD in Political Science. Mexican writer on politics, and economics. (Interviewed July 2008).
5
Nicolas Foucras Tournaud, PhD in Political Science. Head of the Political Science department, ITEMS (Instituto
Tecnológico y De Estudios Superiores de Monterrey) Campus Monterrey. (Interviewed August 2008).
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Once the country became a net petroleum exporter pressure grew to expand public
spending. The number of state owned enterprises quadrupled to 1,200 (Calderón-Madrid, 1997).
Under President Portillo (1976-1982) expenditure outstripped petroleum revenues and an
anaemic taxation system (Solís, 1981). As a consequence, the economy began to overheat
(Appendix A).

To finance these projects Mexico borrowed $78bn. by 1981 (Alarcon and

McKinley, 1992).

The state’s share of fixed capital formation increased to 50 percent

(Fitzgerald, 1978: 277). As inflation surpassed 25 percent the peso became overvalued, and the
competiveness of exports, apart from oil, diminished (McCaughan, 1993). ‘The merchandise
trade balance deteriorated’ as ‘imports rose while nonoil exports earning stagnated’ (Nash, 1991:
494).
Mexico was poorly positioned when oil prices fell in response to a weakening world
economy in the early 1980s.6

Compounding matters, PEMEX and the Secretaría de

Programación y Presupuesto (SPP), declared oil production would be insufficient to reactivate
the economy.7 Recession in the US reduced demand for Mexican goods, while a sharp increase
in interest rates there reduced the money supply, and put pressure on Mexico’s debt servicing, as
US banks had lent the country $25 billion. Servicing Mexico’s debt reached $16 billion, more
than its revenues from oil (Cornelius, 1985: 89). ‘Collapsing oil prices and rising international
interest rates erased Mexico’s prosperity’ (Starr, 2006: 53).
By 1982, as confidence in the economy waned, Mexicans began converting pesos to
dollars at 25 billion pesos a day.8 The gravity of the situation came to international attention on
August 13, 1982, when:

6

Time Magazine, 22 February, 1982.
Magazine Nexos, Sociedad, Ciencia y Literatura,. January, 1982. “De Díaz Mirón a Díaz Serrano”.
8
Time Magazine, 30 August, 1982.

7

9

The government fired the shot heard around the world, announcing that it could
not meet interest payments coming due within the next few days and initiating
negotiations for bridge loans and rescheduling agreements with the US Treasury,
the IMF, and the private commercial banks (Nelson, 1990: 97).
Mexico’s economic indicators pointed towards crisis (APPENDIX A) (Dornbusch and Edwards,
1991). GDP contracted by 0.6 percent in 1982 and 4.2 percent in 1983, while the inflation
reached 58.92 percent in 1982 (Katz, 1994). Output fell in all industries,9 unemployment jumped
towards 15 percent,10 while more than 20 million people, half the workforce, were
underemployed (Cornelius, 1985: 92). Compounding matters, US banks stopped lending to
Mexican companies as they already owed US$600 million in interest.11 The budget deficit stood
at 16.5 percent of GDP.12
In 1983 inflation reached triple digits, the national debt continued to rise, and the level of
capital formation slackened (Appendix A). According to Edwards (1995: 17) this was the worst
crisis to hit Mexico since the Great Depression.

The Third World Magazine13, Gestión y

Estrategia14, and Time Magazine15 referred to Mexico’s difficulties as a crisis.

Mexican

economic magazine Proceso regarded 1982 as Mexico’s worst recession.16 The Third World
Magazine argued the country was effectively bankrupt.17 Minimum wages were insufficient to
meet the needs of most Mexicans (Lustig, 1986).

Opinion polls found great scepticism

concerning the economy (Basañez, 1985).

9

ibid.
ibid, 20 December, 1982.
11
ibid, 1 January, 1983.
12
ibid., 20 December, 1982.
13
The Third World Magazine, October, 1983. IMF: quick fix- slow poison,
14
Gestión y Estrategia, Calderón, Gilberto, July, 1991. Privatización de la Banca en México.
15
Time Magazine, 15 July, 1987. ‘Last Bow of the Inflation Tamer’.
16
Proceso, Mexican economic and political magazine (1982) La Devaluación de 1982. No. 306, September 11th.
17
The Third World Magazine, December, 1983.
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During 1982 the peso was devaluated twice in order to increase exports (Katz, 1994), but
the economy could not hold onto dollars. New short term loans were taken to counteract capital
flight, but did nothing (Jiménez, 2006). Banco de Mexico’s reserves dried up in a matter of
weeks.18

In his Sixth Annual Presidential Report, Portillo stated that the economy was

experiencing the worst crisis in its history.19
Bailey (1980: 54) identified trends that produced economic panic: excessive government
outlays; $15 billion in short-term loans which funded capital flight; an overvalued peso; and
dollarization. Despite growing by 8 percent annually between 1978 and 1981, by the end of
1982, Mexico faced one of the severest crises in its history (Barker and Brailovsky, 1983).

The Brazilian Economy in the Late 1990s
Brazil undertook an inflation stabilization programme in 1994, the Plano Real (Netto, 1999),
pegging the real to the dollar. Inflation fell from 50 percent per month in 1995 to 3.2 percent
annually by 1998 (Appendix B). However, there was substantial exchange rate appreciation,
making Brazilian goods relatively more expensive, contributing to a current account deficit by
1997 (Bulmer-Thomas, 1999: 730).
Interest rates doubled as the repercussions from the Asian financial crisis reached Brazil,
indicating the fragility of its situation (Heymann, 2001: 16). Simultaneously, inflation began to
rise, reaching 5 percent by 1999. Nevertheless, the authorities promised a new assault on fiscal
problems, now aggravated by higher interest on government debt. However, the government,
with an eye to the 1998 elections, failed to make good on its commitments, and the budget deficit
grew to 8.4 percent of GDP.

18
19

Latin America Regional Reports, 13 August, 1982, p. 1.
Sixth Annual Presidential Report of President López Portillo, September 1st, 1982.
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Following the Asian crisis, and Russian bond default, investors became risk averse
(Kaminsky et al., 2003: 51), reflecting the downgrading of Brazil’s credit rating.20 As $30
billion fled the country in September 1998, the central bank raised interest rates to 43 percent.
By November President Cardoso, safely re-elected, announced measures to slash the deficit, and
right the economy.21
However, the real came under speculative attack in November 1998. To defend the
currency, the central bank pushed interest rates to 50 percent,22 increasing the cost of servicing
public and private debt to the extent that investors became convinced a default was inevitable.
High interest rates, instead of slowing the tide of dollars leaving Brazil, accelerated the process.
The governor of Minas Gerais’s announcement of a 90 day moratorium on debt repayments to
the federal government23, and fears that the governors of Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul
would do likewise, threatened the country’s fiscal integrity (Rothkopf, 1999: 91), sending
investors fleeing the Brazilian capital markets (Cattaneo, 2001: 228). With the Brazilian central
bank losing $2 billion a day,24 the World Bank initiated crisis talks.
A $41 billion IMF-led rescue package was arranged.25 But, President Cardoso was
unable to get an appropriate budget (tax increases/spending cuts) approved.26 The possibility of
default arose.

The upper classes, convinced devaluation of the real inevitable, began

withdrawing investment from Brazil. The fall in gross capital formation for 1998 reflected this
capital flight (Table 2). As foreign direct investment (FDI) went elsewhere the prospects for the

20

Brazil’s rating in 1999; Moody: B2, S&P: -B; Fitch: -BB. See Moody's Investor's Service; Standard & Poor's;
Fitch IBCA; at http://www.latin-focus.com/latinfocus/countries/brazil.
21
The Economist, 21 November, 1998, p. 23.
22
The Independent, 4 December 1999, p. 18.
23
Business and Finance, 25 January, 1999, p. 36.
24
The Evening Standard, 15 January, 1999, p. 41.
25
ibid., 30 January, 1999, p. S12.
26
The New York Times, 28 February, 1999, p. 1.
12

economy, and the value of the real, grew bleak. Unemployment hit 9 percent by the end of
1998.
Despite pledges not to do so,27 the exchange rate band was widened to accommodate
devaluation in January 1999 (Roett and Crandall, 1999: 279). While the real/dollar exchange
rate, which had been close to parity, plummeted to two for one by February. Debt services as a
percentage of exports reached 117 percent by 1999.28 Devaluation also put pressure on the
central bank as its diminishing foreign currency reserves were the only thing preventing further
devaluation.29 However, devaluation did not stop the haemorrhage of dollars.
On the day of devaluation, the Sao Paulo stock exchange fell 10 percent and within a few
weeks this policy collapsed, forcing the resignation of a second central bank governor. Arminio
Fraga, the new governor, floated the currency,30 but the country plunged into recession with
declines in industrial output and GNP.31 The percentage of the population below the poverty line
surpassed 25 percent.32 The New York Times – observing that Brazil was in crisis, with capital
fleeing, and state governments defying the central authority33 – predicted a debt default.34 Real
GDP was stagnant throughout 1998 and 1999 (Appendix B), while GDP per capita fell by 1.39
and 0.7 percent in the same period.35 However, the inflation did not surpass 7 percent.36
‘Many commentators assumed Brazil would have to restructure its debt (a euphemism for
default)’ (Bulmer-Thomas, 1999: 736). Summers (2000: 5) regarded this as one of the major
international financial crises of the 1990s. By early March 1999 the Brazilian central bank was
27

The Washington Post, 11 February, 1999, p. A31.
The Independent, 14 January, 1999, p. 1.
29
The Daily Mail, 15 January, 1999, p. 65.
30
Financial Times, 4 March, 1999, p. 6.
31
Business and Finance, 19 August, 1999, p. 10.
32
Brazil, http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=br&v=69
33
The New York Times, 31 January, 1999, p. 16.
34
ibid., 31 January, 1999, p. 16.
35
Data Gob, Governance Indicators Database, http://www.iadb.org/DataGob/
36
The Economic Intelligence Unit – Country Report: Brazil, March 2003.
28
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still struggling to prop up the real.37 According to Summers and Williamson (2001: 56) at the
heart of the Brazilian crisis was that its pegged exchange rate lacking sufficient
institutionalisation of the measures necessary to make the peg stick.
Table 1 – The Identification of Macroeconomic Crisis
The Observable Implications
O1. Was GDP growth was stagnant?
O2. Was total debt as a percentage of GNI was above 100%?
O3. Was annual inflation was above 15%?
O4. Was the annual interest rate was above 15%?
O5. Was the annual unemployment rate was above 15%?
O6. Did opinion polls find the public regarded the economic in crisis?
O7. Did the media regard the economy in crisis?
O8. Did economic and political commentators regard the economy in crisis?
O9. Did the central bank regard the economy as in crisis?
O10. Did domestic/ international organisations regard the economy as in
crisis?
O11. Did elected representatives regard the economy as in crisis?
O12. Were gov pronouncements on the economy were consistent with a crisis
management approach?

Economic Crisis

Mexico
1981-1983
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Brazil
1999-2003
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X

According to the framework Mexico experienced a macroeconomic crisis, as it satisfied all
observable implications (Table 1). The economy was stagnant, debt out of control, inflation and
interest rates very high, and the general perception amongst politicians, economic commentators,
and the media, was of crisis.

Although Brazil (1998-2000) satisfied only 70 percent of the

observables (Table 1), we argue that it experienced an economic crisis. This is because its
economy was stagnant, investment was declining, and the media, public, and economic
commentators, regarded the economy in a crisis.
In terms of severity, Mexico’s crisis was more acute than Brazil’s. This is clear from
developments in Mexico at the time, and is also borne out by all of the above observables
pointed to a crisis there. Thus, although both states experienced economic crises during the
37

The Times, 3 March, 1999, p. 12.
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years in question, their severity differed. Holding with Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) critical
juncture framework, which argues that a crisis induced consolidation of a new idea – replacing
an extant idea – can lead to significant policy change, the next section will see if ideas
underlying the economic policies in both states changed at these times.

Section 4.2: Testing for Ideational Change
Previous policies can be discredited due to their implication in, or inability to right, a crisis
(Levy, 1994). Although economic crises can have great impact they will not determine policy,
whose formulation is ‘centred in domestic political and ideational processes’ (Golob, 2003: 375).
Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework contends that significant policy change depends
upon actors reaching consensus upon, and consolidating around, a new set of ideas. This
corresponds to McNamara’s (1998: 4-5) argument that actors utilize new ideas to chart policy
strategy. ‘Ideas facilitate the reduction of … barriers by acting as coalition-building resources
among agents who attempt to resolve the crisis’ (Blyth, 2002: 37).

Ideas are the casual

mechanisms of change in a critical juncture (Golob, 2003). Thus, ideational change stands
between a crisis and policy change.
Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework contends that new ideas are introduced by
three groups of change agents. Combinations of these agents constitute a policy network (Hall,
1993). The most important are what Dahl (1961) termed ‘political entrepreneurs’. Political
entrepreneurs ‘exploit moments of instability’ and ‘invest resources in the creation of a new
policy, a new agency, or new forms of collective action’ (Sheingate, 2003: 188-190). In a crisis,
a political leader, usually an opposition leader, will seek new ideas to rectify the ills of an
existing policy paradigm.

The second group are Kingdon’s (1995: 179-183) ‘policy

entrepreneurs’. These are agents who spread ideas to replace the current paradigm. They may
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be civil servants, technocrats, academics, economists and interest groups. The final group of
change agents consists of outside influences: the media, the OECD, IMF and the World Bank.
They critique an existing economic paradigm, advocating a new one. Both policy entrepreneurs
and outside influences are responsible for producing ideas, but, political entrepreneurs introduce
ideas into the policy process.
According to Legro’s (2000: 419) two-stage model of ideational change, if agents agree
the existing paradigm is deficient and should be replaced, the first stage – ideational collapse –
has occurred. These are the observables for ideational collapse:

Ideational Collapse
O1. The media questions the efficacy of the current model.
O2. Opposition political parties critique the current model and propose alternative ideas –
at election time their platform will be built around these alternatives.
O3. Civil society organizations, e.g. labour unions, employer organizations, consumer
groups etc. critique the current model
O4. Widespread public dissatisfaction with the current paradigm, observable through
opinion polls, protests etc.
O5. External/international organizations critique the current model and/or actively
disseminate alternative ideas.
Change agents in the form of policy entrepreneurs, and outside influences, propose a solutions.
However, ‘even when ideational collapse occurs, failure to reach consensus on a replacement
could still produce continuity, as society reflexively re-embraces the old orthodoxy’ (Legro,
2000: 424). The crucial issue is reaching consensus on a new set of ideas. If consensus is
achieved it marks the second stage of Legro’s model – consolidation – agents coordinating a
16

replacement set of ideas. This can be seen in political entrepreneurs consolidating innovations
by combining a mixture of interests to produce a winning coalition (Sheingate 2003: 192-193).
Oliver and Pemberton (2004) identified this process as “policy learning”.

Below are the

observables for new ideational consolidation.
New Ideational Consolidation
O6. Clear alternative ideas, developed by policy entrepreneurs, are evident.
O7. A clear change agent (political entrepreneur) injecting new ideas into the policy arena
is evident.
O8. The Political Entrepreneur combines a mixture of interests to produce consensus
around a replacement paradigm.
Policies are protected by underlying ideas. The greater the consensus encompassing an idea the
more protected the policies derived from it. Protected policies represent continuity, whereby
once a policy has become institutionally embedded, ‘policy-making becomes possible only in
terms of these ideas’ (Blyth, 2001: 4). Referring to policies as protected is similar to Golob’s
notion of ‘policy frontiers’ (2003: 363).

The Ideas Underlying Mexican Macroeconomic Policy
Populist-redistributive models were implemented by PRI presidents between 1934 and 1976
(Sandersen, 1983: 319). When Portillo came to office he was forced to contemplate reduced
expenditure due to the oil crisis (Woodhead, 1980). However, the discovery of oil changed
everything, with Portillo adopting a patronage model embracing industrialisation and expansive
state expenditure (Bailey, 1980). This produced high growth, however, the economy remained
vulnerable.
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Rather than pay the political price that sweeping redistributive policies-especially tax
reform-would have entailed, the Portillo administration (1976-1982) sought to
expand the entire economic pie and increase the role of the state in the economy, as
banker, entrepreneur, and employer (Cornelius, 1985: 88).
Despite oil revenues, the economy became fuelled on borrowing and declining real wages.38
However, once oil prices fell, and interest rates spiked, Mexico faced the prospect of debt
default. The ideas underlying extant economic policy underwent a rethink. By mid March 1982,
President Portillo’s administration introduced an economic stabilization plan.39
During the 1982 presidential election all contenders focused on the crisis. Miguel De La
Madrid, a fiscal conservative, was the PRI’s presidential candidate.40 He was ‘among the leaders
of the conservative faction based in the treasury’ (Nelson, 1990: 98).

Shifts in a more

conservative direction within the PRI led to De La Madrid’s selection (Villegas, 1981). Mexican
society was in turmoil, and free market supporters wanted a president who would support the
rights of private property (Luna et al., 1987). The choice of De La Madrid constituted a rupture
with the PRI’s revolutionary ideology (Cárdenas, 2008)41.
During the campaign, De La Madrid stressed the differences between his proposed
government and that of Portillo. “Crises come about because the government tries to consolidate
all interests at the same time...” declared De La Madrid.42 His proposed government would
mobilise resources to change the economy’s direction.43 ‘In the post-1982 environment, policy
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options and instruments appeared limited [for Mexico], which as a debtor was subject to the
conditionality imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’ (Golob, 2003: 375).
In his inauguration address De La Madrid declared that a new economic approach was
needed.44 Sources of external finance dried up in the aftermath of the crisis, while oil revenues
remained stagnant (Hernandez, 2008). Locked into a harsh IMF bailout, negotiated by the
outgoing administration, De La Madrid presented a programme for policy change.45 To maintain
economic, political, and social order, a break with the past was required. Acting as a political
entrepreneur, De La Madrid selected his ministers from the conservative wing of the PRI
(Nelson, 1990: 98). He wanted to take policy to the right, stabilizing and opening the economy
(Lustig, 1992: 28). The new administration prioritized integration into the world economy by
attracting FDI; and focusing on high tech industries.

The Ideas Underlying Brazilian Macroeconomic Policy
The state played an important role in Brazil’s development (Goldstein, 1999: 675). After the
first oil crisis the Geisel administration implemented an expansionary growth strategy (Pinheiro
and Giambiagi, 1999: 7). However, the rising nation debt burdened the economy, and as interest
rates rose servicing this debt became problematic (Baer, 2001). GDP growth stagnated to 1.2
percent per annum during the 1980s (Berg et al., 2006: 46). After a half century of importsubstitution industrialisation the economy was opened in 1990 under President Collor (Berg et
al., 2006: 49).
The 2002 election saw widespread discontent with the market model due to the Real
Crisis and persistent indigence (Samuels, 2006). Luiz Inácio Lula de Silva and the Partido dos
Trabalhadores (PT) initially contested the election attacking the market-friendly policies of
44
45
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Cardoso. The PT’s program for government, Concepção e Diretrizes do Programa de Governo
do PT para o Brasil emphasized state intervention and poverty reduction.46 Public opinion
echoed these sentiments.47
Following market jitters concerning statist policies, Lula announced he would not reverse
capitalist reforms, but would seek to make them fairer.48 Market fears were exacerbated by the
meltdown of the Argentine economy, and worries that Brazil might also default.49 Investor
anxiousness sent the value of the Real tumbling again.50 In response, the PT released a toned
down Programa de Governo do PT.51 Just before the election, to assuage investors confidence,
Lula released Carta ao Povo Brasileiro (Letter to the People of Brazil). It stated that he was not
going to implement the leftist ideology of the PT if elected (Flynn, 2005: 1246). It suggested he
would seek to ensure economic stability, and did not criticize free market policies.52 Lula was
cognisant of his impact upon the market, and ‘that economic autarchy [was] not an option for an
export-driven economic powerhouse.’53 He recognised that a program that might result in
default would make it difficult for him to implement his social policies.54
Ideational contestation occurred, but Lula failed to present an alternative to an open
economy. Recognising economic realities, he moderated his rhetoric, and moved to the right.55
Closing the economy, and renationalizing firms, would scare investor (Weyland, 2004: 144).
Throughout the campaign Lula sought to ‘reassure foreign investors and financial markets that
46
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he [was] not a reckless Marxist firebrand’.56 His only sop to the past was to call for an end to
outright privatisations (unremarkable, as little was left to sell). Lula came to recognise the need
for growth within the context of the extant economic regime, in order to achieve his social
agenda.57 No alternative idea to the open economy was consolidated.

Table 2 – The Identification of Ideational Change
The Observable Implications
Ideational Collapse
O1. Media questioning efficacy of current model.
O2. Opposition parties critique current model and propose alternative ideas – at
elections their platform are built around these alternative ideas.
O3. Civil society organisations critique the current model.
O4. Widespread public dissatisfaction with current paradigm, observable through
opinion polls, protests etc.
O5. External or international organisations critique current model or, actively
disseminate alternative economic ideas.

Mexico

Brazil

1981-1983

1999-2003

X
X

X

X
X

X
X

X
Y

New Ideational Consolidation
O6. Clear alternative ideas are evident
O7. A clear change agent (political entrepreneur) to inject these new ideas into
policy arena is evident
O8. Political Entrepreneur combines a mixture of interests to produce consensus
around a replacement paradigm

Adoption of New Idea

Y

X
X
X
Y

N

In relation to Mexico, see from Table 2 that all observable implications concerning extant
ideational collapse, and new consolidation, were satisfied. Vast expenditure, based on the belief
that oil revenues could support rapid industrialisation, led the country to the brink of bankruptcy.
This resulted in widespread criticism of the economic policy of import substitution, and as a
result the ideas underpinning it collapsed. De La Madrid, acting as a political entrepreneur,
championed a new set of ideas on opening the economy.
For Brazil, we see from Table 2 that three of the observable implications concerning
ideational collapse were satisfied, while no observable for new ideational consolidation was.
56
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Although the free market model was challenged in Brazil, no viable alternative was presented.
Lula’s opposition to economic openness mellowed as he came to recognise that turning his back
on international finance/markets would make it impossible to achieve his social policies.
Thus, although both countries experienced economic crises, only in Mexico did the ideas
on how to manage the economy change. There, changes agents, led by a political entrepreneur in
De La Madrid, consolidated around a replacement set of idea. In Brazil, a political entrepreneur,
willing to take policy in a new direction, was absent.
Next we examine both countries for changes in economic policy. Based on the results so
far, Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework leads us to anticipate finding radical economic
policy change in Mexico, due to ideational change, but not in Brazil, due to the absence of
ideational change.

Section 4.3: Identification of Policy Change
McNamara (1998) argues that new ideas change the wider policy environment. The level of
policy change depends upon the preceding variables, but is also central to determining if there
was a critical juncture. Based on Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework we hypothesise
that once there is political entrepreneur led consolidation around a new set of ideas policy change
should follow. The observable implications are based upon Hall’s (1993) concepts of first,
second, and third order change. Hall (1993: 291) argued that exogenous shocks, and policy
failures, discredit the old paradigm, leading to a re-examination of the belief systems through
which that policy was created – a paradigmatic, or third order, change. The observables set out
below enable us identify, and differentiate, normal and fundamental shifts in policy. They also
incorporate the notion of swift and enduring change (Hogan, 2005).
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O1.

If economic policy instrument settings changed (swiftly and for longer than one

government’s term of office) there may have been a radical change in government economic
policy.
O2.

If the instruments of economic policy changed (swiftly and for longer than one

government’s term of office) there may have been a radical change in government economic
policy.
O3. If the hierarchy of goals behind economic policy changed (swiftly and for longer than one
government’s term of office) there may have been a radical change in government economic
policy.

Mexican Economic Policy
The first policy response to the crisis, from Portillo’s administration, sought to keep domestic
interest rates competitive (Looney, 1985: 112), while incentivising exports. For decades free
trade was ‘the policy option that dare not speak its name’ (Golob, 2003: 370). In his inaugural
address in December 198258 De La Madrid outlined an austerity program – Programa Inmediato
de Reordenacion Economica (Lustig, 1998: 29). He sent a draconian budget to Congress,59
while the budgets of 1982-1984 represented sustained austerity (Cornelius, 1985: 117).
The

ideas

underlying

industrialisation collapsed.

state-led

development,

based

on

import

substitution

The government ‘embraced an approach toward liberalisation,

privatisation and deregulation’ (Pastor and Wise, 1997: 421). These policies had a significant
impact upon Mexico’s economic, and social, development (Cornelius, 1985: 84). The new
approach to the economy focused on using international forces as promoters of liberalisation
(Middlebrook, 2004). However, a major concern was Mexico’s inability to compete in foreign
58
59
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markets, and its inadequate level of saving.60 De La Madrid’s administration signalled its desire
for new FDI by relaxing restrictive FDI laws (Cornelius, 1985: 115), permitting Mexican
businesses form international partnerships (Tournaud, 2008).
De La Madrid pegged the peso at a more "realistic" exchange rate, and introduced plans
to restructure the bureaucracy. He implemented conventional monetary and fiscal austerity,
more extensive trade liberalisation, and a less confrontational approach to the IMF (Nelson,
1990: 63). ‘Acceptance of the IMF embrace [was] a major break-through’ (ISG, 1982: 1720), as
it permitted Mexico avoid a debt moratorium (Looney, 1985: 121). The initial adjustment
package sought to ameliorate external debt through a reduction of government spending and
devaluation. This enabled Mexico reach its IMF targets for reducing the public sector deficit,
unfortunately it had a severe recessionary impact (Pastor and Wise, 1997: 421).
De La Madrid recognised that his administration could not rely on oil exports.61 The
solution to financing development was sought through privatising public enterprises, of which
1,155 were sold off (Hernandez, 2008). De La Madrid sought to combine macroeconomic
stabilisation and structural change, with a focus on export orientated manufacturing (Cornelius,
1985: 110). This was part of the objective of integrating Mexico into the world economy.
The relationship between the private sector and the state transformed (Middlebrook,
2004). The neoliberal reforms made the private sector a key player in reviving the economy
(Beristain, 2008; Tournaud, 2008). Business organisations became engaged in debates over
economic policy, where previously the private sector had been kept at a distance (Golob, 2003:
371).
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De La Madrid’s approach focused on development with a social objective, but based
upon economic reality.62 Reform changed the country’s social ideology (Hernandez, 2008;
Rubio, 2008). Thus, Mexican economic history can be divided into before, and after, 1982
(Cárdenas, 2008; Serra-Puche, 2008).

Mexico started down a different path under De La

Madrid. In the wake of economic crisis, and change in the ideas underlying economic policy,
Mexico experienced a third-order macroeconomic policy change.

The market replaced

regulation, private ownership replaced public ownership, and competition replaced protectionism
(Pastor and Wise, 1997: 421).

Brazilian Economic Policy
Prior to his inauguration investors were concerned that Lula would be unable to manage the 9th
largest economy in the world, and that his policies would be dominated by PT ideology (Flynn,
2005: 1245). They also feared a debt default, as in Argentina. When Lula assumed office in
January 2003 his appointment of Antonio Palocci, who had privatised utilities during the 1990s,
as finance minister, and Henrique Meirelles, a free market economist, as head of the Central
Bank, signalled his economic intentions.63 His economic staff was made up of those who had
abandoned the populist ideas of the PT (de Castro and de Carvalho, 2003: 484). Palocci assured
investors that the new government would pursue fiscal restraint, low inflation and an open
market.64
This assuaged fears of a lurch to the left (Edwards, 2007: 74). The PT government,
abandoning radicalism, maintained the free market, and budgetary stability, of its predecessors.
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It kept a grip on the money supply and implemented severe spending cuts.65 By not taking the
economy in a new direction, but working within established frameworks, financial markets
gained confidence (Edwards, 2007: 73).
Instead of revising Brazilian macroeconomic policy the PT reversed its own position, as
signalled in the Carta ao Povo Brasileiro. Some saw this adoption of the economic program of
the outgoing Cardoso administration as betrayal of the ideals upon which the PT was founded
(Bourne, 2008: 153).

Radicalism was replaced with an orthodox approach to economic

management. Nevertheless, improved the exchange rate, and reduced the risks associated with
Brazilian government bonds. The economy responded, growing by 5 percent in 2004, up from
0.5 percent in 2003 (Flynn, 2005: 1223), and it began to run a current account surplus.
The president established a number of high profile posts on social policy, to help the poor
(de Castro and de Carvalho, 2003: 484). Lula, through medidas provisória (provisional decree)
144/03, ensured the state electricity company, Eltrobras, and its subsidiaries Eletronorte, Chesf,
Furnas and Eletrosul would be exempt from the Programa Nacional de Desestatização (The
National Program of Destatisation – PND), created under Collor.66 However, José Dirceu, PT
Chief of Staff, assured the markets that the government would not re-nationalise companies.67
Nevertheless, there was surprise in November 2003, when the privatization of state banks, which
Lula had opposed while waiting to assume office, proceeded.68

To encourage foreign

investment, Lula unveiled plans for public-private partnerships. Private firms could invest in
state enterprises, which largely conformed with President Collor’s PND.
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By the end of Lula’s first term, it was clear his economic policies were a continuation of
his predecessor’s. Acceptance of a disciplined approach to the economy gained him the support
of previously wary investors.69 The instrument settings of economic policy may have changed,
but the instruments and hierarchy of goals underling economic policy remain the same. What
changed was ‘the PT's programmatic trajectory: the support for the financial economic sector,
previously so harshly criticized’ (Bianchi and Braga, 2005: 1761).
Table 3 – The Identification of Change in Government Economic Policy
The Observable Implications
O1. If industrial policy instrument settings changed there may have been a radical
change in economic policy
O2. If the instruments of industrial policy changed there may have been radical
change in economic policy
O3. If the hierarchy of goals behind industrial policy changed there may have been a
radical change in economic policy
Critical Juncture in Macroeconomic Policy

Mexico
1981-1983
X

Brazil
1999-2003
X

X
X
Y

N

In Mexico we identified an economic crisis and ideational change. According to the framework,
ideational change is the differentiating factor between crises that lead to paradigmatic policy
changes, and those that do not. At the end of the previous section our indentifying ideational
change in Mexico led us to anticipate a third order change in Mexican macroeconomic policy,
which we identified in Table 3. According to Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) three stage
framework, the economic crisis, ideational change, and radical change in privatisation policy
constituted a critical juncture.
Although there was an economic crisis in Brazil, there was no ideational change. The
absence of ideational change led us to anticipate the absence of radical policy change. This was
confirmed in Table 3. The inability of Lula to champion an alternative set of economic idea
resulted in only a first-order change in economic policy. There was no critical juncture in
Brazilian macroeconomic policy.
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Conclusion
We examined two economic upheavals, Mexico (1981-1983) and Brazil (1999-2003), to
determine if there were critical junctures in their economic policies. To answer this question we
employed Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) three stage framework for identifying critical
junctures. Our findings were a critical juncture in Mexican economic policy, but relatively
minor change in Brazilian economic policy.
According to the framework the economic malaise in Mexico (1981-1983) constituted an
economic crisis. The ideational foundations of extant economic policy collapsed in 1982, in the
midst of this crisis. Import substitution and the restrictions imposed upon FDI were perceived as
failing. In this context, De La Madrid assumed the role of political entrepreneur, fostering an
alternative set of ideas on economic management.

Change agents, led by the political

entrepreneur, consolidated around the idea of opening the economy to free trade – a reversal of
previous policy. De La Madrid altered the setting, instruments, and hierarchy of goals behind
Mexican economic policy – third order policy change. Thus, there was a crisis, ideational
change, and radical change in economic policy, what the framework rates a critical juncture.
The framework also identified an economic crisis in the Brazilian economy (1999-2003).
Although ideational collapse occurred, Lula, the likely candidate to fulfil the role of political
entrepreneur, declined the opportunity to champion change agents’ alternative ideas on managing
the economy. Consequently, a coherent policy alternative was not injected into the policy
making environment. Instead, Lula, and his party, performed a u-turn, accepting the market
friendly ideas of the outgoing Cardoso administration, which they had previously criticised. In
the absence of ideational change there was only a first order change in Brazilian economic
policy.
28

Hogan and Doyle’s framework provided valuable insights into the policy change
processes in both countries. As the framework possesses a level of rigor the results it produced
are comparable, even thought the cases examined are from different countries in different
decades. By situating the cases in a comparative context, the framework permits us to see how
changes in economic policy arise. The significance of employing this framework is that make
the identification of what is, and what is not, a critical junctures more straightforward. The early
1980s witnessed a dramatic shift in Mexican economic policy, this in the wake of economic
crisis, collapse of the ideas underlying protectionism, and consolidation of a new set of economic
ideas under political entrepreneur De La Madrid. In Brazil, 20 years later, the absence of a
political entrepreneur, despite an economic crisis, ensured that an alternative set of economic
ideas was not consolidated, leaving the foundations of extant policy intact. The economic policy
changes, instituted by De La Madrid, served as a cornerstone for Mexican economic policy going
forward.
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APPENDIX A
Mexico’s Economic Indicators, 1977 – 1983
Year

1977
1978

Unemply
(%)

8.8
6.9

Inflation
(%)

Government
Debt to GNI
ratio

Growth
Rates in Real
GDP

Gross Capital
Formation %
of GDP

29
17.45

39.18
35.86

3.38
8.96

22.84
23.6
29

1979 5.7
18.17
32.79
9.69
25.95
1980 4.2
26.36
30.53
9.22
25.73
1981 4.2
27.93
32.59
8.77
25.94
1982 6.8
58.92
53.3
-0.63
21.56
1983 6.9
101.7
66.53
-4.2
19.77
Source: Data Gob. [WWW document]. URL http://www.iadb.org/DataGob/index.html Mitchell, R. B. (2007)
International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750-2005. 6th ed. Macmillan: Basingstoke; Fleck, S. And
Sorrentino, C. (1994) ‘Employment and Unemployment in Mexico’s Labour force’. Monthly Labour Review,
November (3).

APPENDIX B
Brazil’s Economic Indicators, 1997 – 2003
Year

Unemply
(%)

Inflation
(%)

Government
Debt to GNI
ratio

Growth
Rates in Real
GDP

Gross Capital
Formation %
of GDP

1997 7.8
6.9
25.0
3.3
21.5
1998 9.0
3.2
31.4
0.1
21.1
1999 9.6
4.8
47.3
0.8
20.4
2000 12
7
41.7
4
21.5
2001 9.4
6.84
47.2
1.31
21.2
2002 10.8
8.45
52.6
1.93
19.9
2003 9.7
14.7
48.4
0.5
17.3
Source: Data Gob. [WWW document]. URL http://www.iadb.org/DataGob/index.html Mitchell, R. B. (2007)
International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750-2005. 6th ed. Macmillan: Basingstoke
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